Network structure has a great impact both on hazard spread and network immunization. The vulnerability of the network node is associated with each other, assortative or disassortative. Firstly, an algorithm for vulnerability relevance clustering is proposed to show that the vulnerability community phenomenon is obviously existent in complex networks. On this basis, next, a new indicator called network "hyperbetweenness" is given for evaluating the vulnerability of network node. Network hyper-betweenness can reflect the importance of network node in hazard spread better. Finally, the dynamic stochastic process of hazard spread is simulated based on Monte-Carlo sampling method and a twoplayer, non-cooperative, constant-sum game model is designed to obtain an equilibrated network immunization strategy. key words: network vulnerability community, hyper-betweenness, network immunization strategy, matrix game model, complex networks
Introduction
Vulnerabilities exist inevitably in the design of computer system, software, service application and network structure. How to identify and evaluate network vulnerability, as one of key issues in the field of information security research, has been attracted more and more attention. Generally, there are two kinds of researches on network vulnerability nowadays. One is from the perspective of detecting, utilizing or repairing host vulnerability in a network environment [1] - [3] . The other is from a macro-perspective. Network vulnerability is identified by researching network structural features based on complex network science theory [4] . Then network immunization strategy is put forward [5] - [8] . The work in this paper researches from the latter.
In the late 1990s, the concept of scale-free networks [9] and small world networks [10] appeared. There are many researching achievements in the field of network structure achievement and vulnerability identification. And many empirical researches show that Internet has scale-free and small world features [11] , [12] . Therefore, the theory research of complex network science has strong guiding sense to network security.
Researchers in this field consider that complex networks (especially Internet) are robust yet fragile [13] . It will have greatly negative impact on network service if the nodes or links with high importance are attacked or failed. Network vulnerability is mostly depended on the impact of each Manuscript complement on hazard spread and the negative impact of the complement on network when failed [14] - [16] . For the same kind of hazard (viruses or worms) to a network, it will lead to more serious result (for instance, diffusing to more nodes during a shorter period of time) if the hazard breaks out from certain nodes. Obviously, these nodes are more important to network security defense and control. They are also network vulnerabilities, which await being found out.
The main work of this paper is as follows. Find out network vulnerable nodes and quantize their vulnerabilities. Analyze the relevance of network vulnerabilities and choose the set of network vulnerabilities. Then make out the most effective immunization strategy. The work of this paper is progressed from two aspects.
First, network vulnerability is not static and isolated. The relevance of network vulnerabilities should not be ignored. Traditional researches only emphasize on analyzing network static structure to find out the critical network complements (nodes or links) which are beneficial or impeditive to hazard spread. For example, the nodes with high betweenness or degrees are considered to be protected and controlled especially in many researches [16] , [17] . It is doubtful that critical nodes and their vulnerabilities in network completely rely on their static topology features. The degree distribution of a network can not reflect its structure features accurately and objectively. Generally, a node's vulnerability is partly depended on its static topology features, and partly depended on the relevance with other nodes.
Second, the constitution of network immunization strategy is relied on the result of network vulnerability identification. Because the time and space of network hazard outbreak is uncertain, there does not exist an immunization strategy which has the best immune utility on any condition. The local hazard will diffuse to the whole network in a short time [19] . Therefore, on the condition of limited resources, immunizing the most vulnerable nodes will be an effective way to impede the spread of hazard. In fact, "beneficial to spread" and "impeditive to spread" exist at the same time. So, an effective immunization strategy can not be achieved only by analyzing purely static and unilateral network structure. Instead, the game between attackers (beneficial to spread) and immunizers (impeditive to spread) should be considered. On the aspect of uncertain spread, the Monte Carlo (MC) method can provide us with getting the expectation of nodes' spread abilities [20] . On the aspect of counterwork in spread, the game theory can be used for modeling.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related works. Section 3 identifies network vulnerability relevantly, and obtains the vulnerability communities in complex networks. Section 4 proposes a new indicator to network nodes. The new indicator is used to evaluate nodes' vulnerabilities quaintly. Through introducing the MC method and game theory, Sect. 5 models the process of hazard and immunization spread dynamically. And a method of making the robust network immunization strategy is proposed. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper and gives future works.
Related Works

Research and Analysis on Network Structure Vulnerability
The research on network structure vulnerability analysis is based on the theory of graph. The vulnerability is identified by analyzing the topology features of network complements. These researches are progressing with modeling and analyzing scale-free networks or small world networks. The degree of a node was considered as a preferred indicator to evaluate its vulnerability. Further, it is found that degrees and their distribution only reflect the importance (vulnerability) of nodes in partial. Communication is one of the substantial features of network. In order to reflect the importance of network complements in network transmission, the concept of betweenness is used widely. The betweenness of a node or a link shows the number of the shortest paths through the node or the link. Obviously, betweenness can reflect the features of the whole network better than degrees. Hazard will bring a greater influence if it spreads from nodes with higher betweenness. As a result, these nodes should be immunized and controlled as priority. [16] , [17] analyze many networks' robust to random failures and deliberate attacks. Robust to random failures and fragile to deliberate attacks (Robust yet fragile) are the basic features of scare-free networks. Random failures are used to describe nodes failure behaviors which are irrelevant to network structures. Deliberate attacks aim at the nodes with high degrees or betweenness. [21] analyzes network vulnerability theoretically using percolation theory. It concludes that network has optimal robust to random failures and deliberate attacks when there are only three different degrees in network nodes. [22] studies the problem of controlling malicious attack spread in network. It claims a node's degree reflects the node's ability to infect other nodes in the network. [23] studies the relationship between deletion strategy and network vulnerability. It considers it will bring greater damages to a network if attacking the nodes with higher betweenness. [24] uses statistical method to identify critical components with high connectivity in network. It believes the robust of network can be enhanced by protecting these critical complements (complements with high link betweenness or node degree). [25] proposes an algorithm to evaluate network vulnerability based on complex network theory. It defines the vulnerability indicator of a link and a node as its betweenness and degree respectively. [26] defines vulnerability as the number of a link or a node shared by different paths. Apparently, this number is related with betweenness.
The defects of the betweenness indicator are as follows. First, the betweenness of a node or a link only shows the number of the shortest paths through the node or the link. However, different paths with the same cost have different importance in hazard spread. Second, betweenness is counted of each path. However, the relevance among some paths in hazard spread possibly exists. Third, only one shortest path is considered through each source-destination pair in many researches. Therefore, the result is inaccurate. Finally, the betweenness indicator reflects the features of the dynamics system. In the dynamics system, the shortest path is preferred. However, in the incidents of network security, the spread of many hazards does not necessarily choose the shortest path. So, evaluating network vulnerability with betweenness is not accurate absolutely.
Many researches improve the indicator of betweenness. [27] proposes an improved indicator. In order to evaluate nodes' importance, all paths (the shortest path is included) are considered, and a scaling is introduced to reduce the importance of longer paths. [28] defines a new indicator called λ-betweenness to obtain and analyze complex network community accurately and quickly. In the new indicator, λ is the coefficient and the length of the shortest path between nodes pairs and the length through a certain link are considered. [29] provides a parallel algorithm for calculating the k-betweenness (the numbers of the k-shortest paths through a node). This paper does not discuss the solution to longer paths. Instead, it defines nodes' vulnerable relevance by considering the potential paths of hazard spread. And the indicator of betweenness is improved.
In addition, a node's clustering coefficient [30] is used to reflect its small world feature. The research in [5] shows the shortcut in small world networks is the main factor that affects hazard spread. And the measurement of shortcut can be obtained based on clustering coefficient.
Research on Network Vulnerability of Dynamic Spread
These researches model the network spread dynamically and quantize the spread ability of network complements. The nodes or links which can affect the spread most are found and their vulnerabilities are defined. Based on the feature that hazard spread is dynamic and uncertain, [15] and [32] carry out a security assessment on complex networks which is exposed to security threats based on Cellular Automata and Monte Carlo sampling method. They construct an attack spread model in network and present a method of identifying network vulnerability. In the researches, the propagation delay is an important factor to reflect the uncertainty of hazard spread. This paper uses for reference their experimental methods. Af-ter the Monte Carlo experiments are carried out for many times, the expectation of nodes' spread ability will be equal to nodes' betweenness by static analysis, if the propagation delay subjects to uniform distribution. However, if only the nodes with higher propagation ability expectation are immunized, the utility will not be the optimal.
When researching the process of router communication, in order to find the optimal route when link failure in network has some uncertainty, [14] constructs a two-player, non-cooperative, zero-sum game model. It considers that there exist two sides which are routers with the least cost and attackers with increasing cost by destroying one link in the network. The nodes or links, which can greatly affect the network communication, can be identified by an equilibrated mixed strategy in the game between routers and attackers. [32] also researches similar work. This paper also makes use of game theory to carry out the work.
Research on Network Vulnerability Strategy
The basic purpose of making network vulnerability strategy is to achieve the most robust immunization utility to impede hazard spread to a great extent, under the condition of limited resources.
[33] researches the common network propagation features. It considers that when immunizing randomly in the network, along with the increase of network scale, the immunization threshold will be tend to 1. That is to say, the spread of hazard will not be impeded unless all nodes in the network are immunized. Obviously, it is hard to come true under the condition of limited resources. [6] analyzes worm spread in different network topologies. It believes the time spent by worm infecting most of hosts depends on the location where worm begins to spread to a great extent. Therefore, it will be very helpful to impede worm spread in network if immunizing hosts selectively.
[19] and [7] propose a purposed immunization strategy. The strategy gains little immunization threshold by immunizing a few nodes with higher degree. [8] proposes a preferred immunization strategy. In the strategy, the selected probability of nodes with higher degree is higher than other nodes'. Therefore, the immunization utility is approach to purposed immunization's. This paper uses above theory of evaluating immunization utility.
Revelation of Network Vulnerability Community
In this section, we analyze the relevance of network vulnerabilities, and obtain the vulnerability communities in complex networks.
Nodes' Static Vulnerability
The static vulnerability of nodes in network communication is analyzed and gained. The indicator is the base of an improve one got latter. Definition 1: The static vulnerability V i of node i reflects the degree of this node to be selected as the optimal path for hazard spread in the network N.
Where
refers to the numbers of the optimal paths through node i with source node s and destination node t for hazard spread. T (s,d) refers to the numbers of all the optimal paths with source node s and destination node t for hazard spread. n s,d refers to the number of nodes in this path (node s and node d are not included).
In this paper, the optimal path for hazard spread is equal to the shortest path in communication.
represents the betweenness of node i. Therefore, nodes' static vulnerability can be considered as a betweenness of nodes taking into account importance equilibrium. The equilibrium reflects the balance among some the shortest paths and among some nodes in the same path.
The Bellman-Ford algorithm can be used to solve V j . When calculating the shortest paths, the algorithm uses Breadth-FirstSearch method. The algorithm uses a matrix of N × N and an array of N to hold some essential information, such as the lengths of source to other nodes, passing nodes. The time complexity of Bellman-Ford algorithm is O(N × E) (E is the numbers of edges) and the space complexity is O(N 2 ). The solution to V j needs the information of all nodes pairs' shortest paths in the network. So, the time complexity of the solution to V j is O(N 2 × E).
The Relevance of Network Static Vulnerability
Nodes' static vulnerability is solved by considering each path one by one. The shortest paths are not the only ones which hazard spreads through. When the optimal paths fail, network attack can arrive at its target through other paths. If the costs of these substitutes are not too higher than the cost of the optimal paths, the nodes in the substitute are important and critical to hazard spread. Definition 2: Nodes' conditional vulnerability V j|i is defined as the static vulnerability of node j in a new network N , in which node i is immunized. Where N = N − {i}. Definition 3: The vulnerability relevance between node i and j represents the change of node j's static vulnerability when node i is immunized.
Where V (i) j refers to nodes j's static vulnerability obtained only by considering the optimal paths with node i as source or destination.
Obviously, the change of node j's vulnerability is caused by node i being immunized. The change reflects the potential vulnerability from node j to node i. Generally, r i j r ji . When r i j > 0, once node i is immunized, the hazard which chooses node i as its optimal spread path will change its strategy to node j. Node j can be considered as node i's potential substitution. The higher r i j , the bigger the potential vulnerability from node j to node i is. We define this relationship between node i and j is "vulnerability disassortative".
When r i j < 0, once node i is immunized, node j will lose the ability of selected as the optimal paths. We define the relationship between node i and j is "vulnerability assortative".
When r i j = 0, there is not any relevance between node i and node j. One's degree in hazard spread would not be changed by the other being immunizing.
Clustering Algorithm for Network Vulnerability Community
According to the vulnerability disassortatiy or assortatiy among network nodes, an algorithm for identifying communities is proposed based on the condensation method. The algorithm is used for vulnerability community clustering. The definitions of network vulnerability community' assortative and disassortative degree are as follows. 
The description of the clustering algorithm for network vulnerability community as follows. 1 Initialize |N| communities in the network. Each node represents one community. Construct a triangle matrix Λ = {as m,n , dis m,n } for communities' assortative (or disassortative) relevance
2 Unite two communities with the most assortative relevance and update the relevance matrix Λ. i Unite two communities called m and n with the most assortative relevance to a new community m.
ii Delete all the elements in row n and line n of Λ. Update all the elements in row m and line m according to Formulas (4) and (5). 3 Repeat Step 2 and unite communities continuously until the assortative degree between any two communities is 0. Exit. The time complexity of the initial part is O(n 2 ). The time complexity of Step 2 is O(n log n) by optimized using the heap structure.
Phenomenon of Network Vulnerability Community
This paper analyzes the communication network in [15] . This topology has a total of 52 nodes. And its average degree k = 2.8, which is shown in Fig. 1 .
Carry out the clustering process according to the algorithm in Sect. 3.3. The nodes with the same sign in Fig. 1 belong to the same community. As it is shown in Fig. 1 , the scale of each community is different. There is only one node in some communities.
We further analysis effect and distribution of the network vulnerability community in different types of networks. Examples use the BA and WS model with 1000 nodes. The results shown in Fig. 2 indicate that in SF networks or small-world networks, there is a significant effect of the network vulnerability community. The probability distribution of community size obeys Power-Law.
A New Indicator for Evaluating Nodes' Vulnerability -Hyper-Betweenness
In this Section, we propose a new indicator to network nodes, which is used to evaluate nodes' vulnerabilities quaintly. This new indicator can be used to assess the nodes' vulnerabilities more effectively.
The Disadvantages of Static Vulnerability
Section 3 analyzes the relevance among the vulnerabilities of network nodes. There is possibly that part of a node's vulnerability is overvalued and part is undervalued. The explanations are as follows.
(1) Suppose the relationship between node i and j is vulnerability assortative (r i j < 0). Most of network hazards will select both of them or none of them as their optimal paths. When one is immunized, the other one will not be (a) scale-free network (b) small-world network Fig. 2 The probability distribution of vulnerability community size. Table 1 The nodes with the top 6 static vulnerability. Table 2 The vulnerability relevance among the nodes with the top 6 static vulnerability.
selected. The communication importance held by both of them is calculated to each static vulnerability or betweenness separately. Part of a node's vulnerability is overvalued.
(2) Suppose the relationship between node i and j is vulnerability disassortative (r i j > 0). Node j is a potential substitute to node i. However, this phenomenon is not reflected when evaluating static vulnerability or betweenness.
The nodes in the network shown in Fig. 1 with the top 6 static vulnerability are shown in Table 1 . The relevance matrix R = {r i j } is shown as Table 2 .
As it is shown in Tables 1 and 2, the static vulnerabilities of node 22 and node 26 are the highest. However, the vulnerability assortatiy between the two nodes is higher, too. Once one of them is immunized, the other one will be protected, too.
However, node 24, 38 and 36 can be the substitutes of node 22 to a certain extent. They are the potential critical nodes for network hazards spread. Therefore, their importance should be improved in evaluation.
The Definition of Hyper-Betweenness
This paper proposes a new method of evaluating nodes' vulnerability. This method eliminates the effect brought by vulnerability assortatiy or disassortatiy among nodes. The indicator V i for network nodes vulnerability proposed by this paper is evolved based on the betweenness of node i. Therefore, the indicator is called the hyper-betweenness of node i. Definition 6: Part of node i's vulnerability V i is decided on its own static vulnerability, and part is measured by the relevance with other nodes.
The vulnerability disassortative nodes of node i can be its substitutions. Therefore, V i should be increased according to their relevance. Record this part as β i→k , and β i→k < 0. d is the coefficient. Formula (8) can be carried out iteratively or recursively. Formula (9) is the process during the iteration of t − 1 to t.
Formula (10) shows that node k's own vulnerability should be given to its substitution i proportionally. Formula (11) shows that node i and node k share the vulnerability held by them two proportionally. The basic purpose of nodes vulnerability evaluation is to measure the degree of each node in hazard spread. Therefore, the convergence is decided by the nodes' vulnerability correlation φ obtained by comparing two iterations. Where
.
In our experiment, the convergence is considered to have achieved when the correlation is higher than a given threshold for many times continuously.
Analysis on an Example
The hyper-betweenness of each node in Fig. 1 is calculated. Figure 3 shows the comparison of the hyper-betweenness of the 6 nodes in Table 1 . In the experiment, the convergence is considered to have achieved when the correlation is higher than 0.88 for 200 times continuously. The original betweenness of each node is equal to the hyper-betweenness when d = 0. As it is shown in Fig. 3 , some nodes' vulnerabilities are increased while others are decreased along with the increase of d. d represents the weight of re-evaluated parts. Take node 26 which is the second static vulnerable as an example. When d is changed from 0.15 to −0.25, node 26's hyper-betweenness and its place is decreased. Its vulnerability degree is less than other nodes. Therefore, it can identify potential nodes with high vulnerability by using hyperbetweenness to evaluate each node's vulnerability.
Modeling of a Equilibrated Network Immunization Strategy
As mentioned above, the solution to evaluate the vulnerability of network nodes in hazard spread is obtained. Next, we will solve the problem how to evaluate the vulnerability of each network node quantitatively in order to make a relatively equilibrated network immunization strategy, when hazard spread and immunization measures both exist in network. Therefore, a two-player, finite, constant-sum game model is constructed to identify network vulnerabilities.
Game Modeling
Definition 7: A game model used for network vulnerability analysis is Γ = P; S 1 , S 2 ; A; N . Where P Δ = {IMM, ATK} are immunizers and attackers in network respectively. They are the two players in the game. S 1 = {α | 1 ≤ α ≤ n, α ∈ N} is the pure strategy set of player IMM, and S 2 = {β | 1 ≤ β ≤ n, β ∈ N} is the pure strategy set of player ATK. S 1 and S 2 refer to the node that immunizers and attackers select respectively. A 1 = (PayoffImm α,β ) n×n and A 2 = (PayoffAtk α,β ) n×n are utilities of player IMM and ATK respectively when IMM takes pure strategy α and ATK takes β. N = {V, E, d} refers to the network to be analyzed.
In Γ, the solution to A is a critical problem. (1) Evaluate quantitatively hazard effect caused by attack spreading from a certain node; (2) Assess quantitatively restraint effect on attack spread caused by immunizing a certain network node; (3) Determine the outcome of the game (that is who wins and the utility of each player) after each player selects and implements their own strategy; (4) Find out the mixed strategy of the game, which is Nash equilibrated, and make use of the strategy into network immunization. The following section will discuss these problems.
Description of Spread Algorithm Based on Monte
Carlo Sampling Definition 8: Denote the state of network node i at time t by s i (t). s i (t) = 1, ∅, 0 represent the node is infected, immunized and normal respectively. According to the fact of network hazard spread, it is apparent that
Where N ( j) i refers to the jth neighbor of node i. For any s i (t), s i (t) ∨ ∅ = s i (t). Definition 9: Denote the time delay of hazard spreading from node i to node j by d i j . The value of time delay is unexpected. In practice, we can define the time delay as the time spent by attack spreading from node i to node j, or define it as the cost or difficulty for attack spreading from node i to node j. Generally, d i j d ji . And if s i (t) = ∅, d i j = ∞. Definition 10: The lowest cost c i j for attack spreading from node i to node j can be referred by the length of the shortest path between node i and node j. That is c i j = d ik 1 + d k 1 k 2 + · · · d k m j . Where i → k 1 → · · · → k m → j is the shortest path between node i and node j. And the path has m steps. Definition 11: Define hazard effect ε(i) when attack spreads from node i and none of nodes is immunized as max(c i j ), j ∈ V. The hazard effect expectation ε(i) can reflect a node's spread ability. And the bigger ε(i) is, the weaker the spread ability of node i is. After node k is immunized, define immunization effect ε(i, k) when attack spreads from node i as max(c i j ), j ∈ V − {k}.
When network topology structure is given, the time delay in any link connecting node i and j will determine the criticality and vulnerability of each node in network. Taking into account the uncertainty of network hazard spread process, Monte Carlo method is used to sample d i j randomly. Set time delay d i j between node i and node j subjecting to discrete uniform distribution between [1, μ] . And set the number of Monte Carlo sampling at n. A node's hazard effect expectation ε(i) can be obtained.
Establishment of Two Player's Payoff Functions
The payoff function represents a player's income expectation in the game with different strategies. Definition 12: Suppose each player selects a strategy, and the selected strategy of player IMM and ATK are α and β respectively. Then a game situation Ω(β, α) is constituted. Denote attackers' current income by ε(β, α). For any immunization strategy α, there must be a strategy α * , which makes ε(β, α * ) = max[ε(β, α)] optimal for attack strategy β. Denote the optimal strategy by ε(β, α * ).
Therefore, the payoff function of player IMM can be set as follows.
The payoff function of player ATK is:
In the model of this paper, for any attack strategy β, if immunizers select the optimal immunization strategy α * , their income will be 1. At this time, immunization impedes the spread of hazard in network and increases the cost of hazard spread to the greatest extent. On the contrary, if immunizers select the worst strategy α ∧ , which makes ε(β, α ∧ ) ≈ ε(β), attackers' income will be 1 and immunization will be nearly effectless.
Solution to Mixed Strategy of the Game Model
For the model Γ = P; S IMM , S ATK ; Payoff ; N , we need to find at least one mixed strategy to instruct the two players to make their own strategy according to corresponding probabilities, which can maximize their incomes under the condition that the other player exists and also gains the maximum income. Denote The mixed game problem is a constant-sum game, which can be converted into a zero-sum game for solving. And a zero-sum game can be described by a maximin problem
Where E refers to immunizers' or attackers' income expectation.
When player IMM uses the mixed strategy s * IMM = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m ) ∈ S * IMM , his income is at least w. And he hopes to maximize w. Therefore, s * IMM is the optimal solution to a linear program P 1 .
Set p i = p i w . Where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. So P 1 is equivalent to a linear program P 1 described as follows. 
An equilibrated network immunization strategy can be obtained by solving the linear program problem. Definition 13: Suppose a i is the pure strategy of immunized node i, p i is the probability of the pure strategy. An equilibrated network immunization strategy can be denoted as a i , p i i ∈ N, p i = 1 .
Analysis on an Example
We calculate the attack income ε(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , 52 of each node in Fig. 1 when immunizers do not exist. Set μ = 10 and the number of Monte Carlo sampling as 1000. The expectation of costs spent by hazard spreading from each node can be calculated by large-scale Monte Carlo sampling. The result is shown in Fig. 4 . It can be observed from Fig. 4 in the network example, security threats can diffuse to the whole network more easily if spreading from node 22 instead of other node. It is consistent with the result of vulnerability evaluation. Can we conclude that hazard spread will be impeded to the greatest extent when node 22 is immunized? Figure 5 shows the change of ε(i, 22), ε(i, 18) and ε(i, 1) after node 22, node 18 and node 1 are immunized respectively. It can be observed that the immunization effect is better when node 22 is immunized. However, for any i, ε(i, 22) is not always the biggest. Assume the node id on X-axis and the expectation of costs spent by hazard spreading from each node to the whole network on Y-axis both in Figs. 4 (a) and (b). Figure 4 (a) shows the probability distribution of costs spent by hazard spreading to the whole network from node 1 and node 22 respectively. And the number of Monte Carlo sampling is 1000. ε(1) = 54.56 and ε(22) = 39.1 can be calculated from the distribution. Figure 4 (b) shows the spread ability of each 52 node.
In other words, we may not obtain the best immunization effect if deploying all the limited immunization resources to node 22. Attackers can always find a strategy to make immunizers' income the minimum. Therefore, we need to find out an equilibrated mixed strategy when there is no absolute effective immunization pure strategy. Table 3 An equilibrated mixed strategy of IMM and ATK.
Fig. 6
Comparison of the expectation utility using mixed strategy and pure strategy.
According to our method, the result shown in Table 3 is obtained. The calculation precision is taken as 10 −3 . From the view of immunizers, because of the ubiquitous network attack, there does not exist an absolute effective pure strategy that can always make immunization effect the best. Therefore, the application of a mixed strategy will effectively improve network's emergency response ability to security threats. From the view of attackers, because of the deployment of network immunization resources, attacking nodes with higher ε(i) blindly will not always obtain the maximum income. Immunization strategy made according to the result is exactly the most robust. Our strategy is obtained under the condition of gaming with network attackers, which is different from previous immunization strategy. Figure 6 assumes the increase of attack cost after immunization on X-axis and the percentage of nodes on Yaxis. A point (x, y) in the figure means the cost will be increased by x% if attack spreads from any node in y% nodes. We compare the effects of using equilibrated immunization strategy, immunizing node 22 and node 18, which are the nodes with the highest and the second highest ε(i). It can be observed that the attack cost will be only increased by about 30% if immunizing node 18. However, if using the immunization strategy, it will increase the attack cost by 75% when attack spreads from some certain nodes. Similarly, if immunizing node 22 purely and attack spreading from any node in 38% nodes, the cost will be only increased by 15%. However, if using the immunization strategy, the percentage of nodes, from which cost will get the same incensement if attack spreads, will be decreased to 14%. Therefore, on the whole, the expectation effect will be better if deploying network immunization with mixed strategy instead of immunizing node 22 or node 18 purely.
We further explain the relationship between vulnerable nodes found by our algorithm and the ε(i) of each node. According to the conclusion of previous studies, nodes with lower ε(i) should be immunized as priority naturally. We want to know whether ε(i) of the revealed vulnerable nodes are certainly low. Nine network examples are simulated by the Waxman model with 300 nodes.
The points in Fig. 7 are the vulnerable nodes. The nodes in different network examples are marked different. Assume the selected probability of a node by player IMM on X-axis and the rank of ε(i) of the corresponding node on Y-axis. It can be observed that the nodes whose ranks are down in the list still possess high probabilities to select in some network example. Figure 7 proves our conclusion that some nodes with low ε(i) are also critical nodes of network with certain structure. It will be helpful to improve security performance of the whole network if immunizing them with certain probability.
The equilibrated immunization strategy obtained by the algorithm in this paper is consistent with network vulnerability communities and network nodes' super-betweenness. After analyzing the examples for many times, it is discovered that the nodes included in the equilibrated immunization strategy are separated into some main communities. It shows that the equilibrated immunization strategy considers the relevance of network vulnerability well. And the strategy provides quantized result based on vulnerability communities.
Conclusions and Future Works
First, this paper analyzes static topology and the distribution features of complex network vulnerability. Based on the analysis on related works, it is proved network vulnerability is not depended on the static topology features completely, such as nodes' degree or betweenness. This paper finds the vulnerability disassortatiy and assortatiy relevance is existent in the network. The phenomenon of vulnerability communities is obvious. This paper proposes a new indicator called network hyper-betweenness for evaluating vulnerability of network nodes. This indicator can evaluate the degree of each node in hazard spread more accurately.
Second, Monte Carlo sampling method is used to simulate massively the stochastic process of hazard spread, in order to obtain the mathematical expectation of the nodes' spread ability for a network with fixed structure. Based on this mathematical expectation, the incomes of attackers and immunizers are evaluated quantitatively after they have selected and implemented the attack or immunization strategy. These incomes are put into a two-player, non-cooperative, constant-sum game model to obtain a mixed Nash equilibrated strategy. It is an equilibrated strategy obtained under the condition of network hazard in existence and spreadable and we can't predict where network hazard spreads from. Therefore, the strategy in this paper can make network immunization utility optimal in average.
The result of static analysis is consistent with that of dynamic modeling. Next, we will introduce the artificial intelligence theory to analyze network immunization and dynamic game heuristically, on the condition of uncompleted information.
